“…each person’s expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do”
That’s a quote from Thomas Schelling about a solution people tend to choose by default in the absence of communication. Nowadays we don’t often find ourselves without the ability to communicate, but imagine this:
Seven-year-old Sophie is at the carnival with her dad Dan. They’re walking through game row. Dan had pontificated about the folly of playing carnival games on their car ride. He knows his bright daughter will recognize how they’re rigged, and she does - until the basket toss. It’s too easy, too straightforward. She pauses to observe. Meanwhile, Dan is head down towards the guaranteed thrill Tilt-A-Whirl. Sophie turns to ask her dad for money. Dan turns to hand his daughter tickets. They both panic. They hadn’t planned for this. Where does she go? Where does he go?
The ticket booth, of course. And then Sophie says, “See dad this is why I need a phone like all the other kids.”
Incentive Alignment
Voting is not the end all be all for decision-making, but it seems to make sense for governing shared resources because everyone has a stake in the outcome. Voter participation is low though, in part because the cost of a person’s time and critical thinking is certain while the benefits of engaging are not. This is why I think voting should be treated as a contribution to collective intelligence rather than a civic duty.
DAOmocracy distributes decisions to random delegations and rewards on the Schelling point of consensus. With random delegation only, the calculation of certain cost with uncertain benefit remains. With a consensus reward only, extractive participation is encouraged. The Schelling point emerges with the combination of these mechanisms because the delegates don’t have communication with each other. They are challenged to cast an informed vote based on what they all know they all have - the proposal, the forum, and a stake in the common good.
I am under no delusion that this is a silver bullet. Among other concerns, too high of a reward could incentivize collusion and too low of a reward could incentivize arbitrariness. Nonetheless, I think this could be a better DAO voting system than we have now, and that’s what we are about around here :)